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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a world in which the effects of a policy change could be tested
in advance. Unintended consequences could be accounted for, mistakes
corrected, and new proposals evaluated—all without the tremendous costs
of a real-world trial. Experimental economics, pioneered by Vernon Smith
(Nobel Laureate, 2002), provides researchers with innovative techniques for
determining the effects of policy changes ex ante. Through the use of
mechanisms designed to capture the incentive structures of real-world
environments, experimenters can reproduce and analyze decision-making
contexts. In addition, benchmark comparisons can be made, and controlled
replication becomes possible. Experiments cannot perfectly represent the
real world, of course, but they allow researchers to test the “what-ifs” of
public policy, at a fraction of the cost of real-world trials. As such, they
provide a valuable tool for evaluating potential reforms.
Concerns about abuse of the American tort system have generated many
calls for reform in recent years.1 The costs of the tort system are escalating
rapidly. A recent Tillinghast–Towers Perrin study placed the total costs of
tort litigation at over $233 billion per year, more than two percent of U.S.
GDP.2 This represents a 13.3% increase from the previous year alone.3
Litigation costs have been growing at an average rate of 9.8% per year since
1951.4 Only 46 percent of this total cost goes to victims in the form of
economic and non-economic damages.5 The Congressional Budget Office
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conjectures: “Even leaving aside the largely unknown indirect costs, the
current tort system seems to be an inefficient way to compensate victims.”6
Legal scholars debate whether or not these large numbers truly indicate
inefficiency,7 but it seems difficult to resolve this question with field data.
Much relevant information, such as pre-trial settlement offers and details of
cases that do not advance to trial, is generally unavailable to researchers.
By allowing us to measure these and other variables that are inherently
difficult to measure in the field, experimental economics provides an
important complement to field research.
Through an experimental study with 128 cash motivated subjects, we
compare pre-trial settlement rates under a two-way cost-shifting rule and
under the American rule of cost allocation. We also examine the effects of
discovery and fee-shifting costs on settlement rates and the efficient use of
the courts. We find no difference in settlement rates between cost
allocation rules; however, the availability of full information to all parties
and the inclusion of attorneys’ fees as recoverable costs significantly
improve pre-trial settlement rates. These results shed light on previous
theoretical work and suggest avenues for further research.

I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Fee Shifting and Settlement Incentives

Some legal scholars advocate fee shifting as a way to deter inefficient
lawsuits.8 One type of fee shifting is codified as Rule 68 of the Federal
Rules of Procedure.9 Rule 68 states:

6

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMICS OF U.S. TORT LIABILITY: A PRIMER
21 (2003).
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According to the Law and Economics literature, it is efficient to use the court system only
when the costs of using that system are less than the cost of using private methods of
resource allocation. See e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 565 (5th
ed. 1998).
8
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“Loser Pays” Rule); Richard Mincer, Rule 68 Offer of Judgment: Sharpen the Sword for
Swift Settlement, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1401, 1404 (1995) (stating that Rule 68 “could play a
significant role in encouraging pretrial settlements of disputes and thus reducing the
caseload facing the judicial system.”).
9
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At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party
defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party
an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the defendant
party for the money or property or to the effect specified in
the offer, with costs then accrued.10
If the offer is not accepted within 10 days, the offer is deemed
withdrawn. “If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more
favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the
making of the offer.”11
The Supreme Court has explained that this rule was designed to
“encourage settlement and avoid litigation”12 as it “prompts both parties to a
suit to evaluate the risks and costs of litigation, and to balance them against
the likelihood of success upon trial on the merits.”13 Nonetheless, the
current implementation of Rule 68 is fundamentally asymmetrical; only the
defendant has the option of serving an offer of judgment. Scholars have
suggested that Rule 68 would promote settlements more effectively if it
were symmetrical, that is, if both sides could be penalized for rejecting
favorable offers.14 This symmetrical type of cost-shifting is generally called
10

Id.
Id. The text of the entire rule reads:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow
judgment to be taken against the defending party for the money or
property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued. If
within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves
written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the
offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and
thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be
deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a
proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the
offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the
costs incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made
but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. When the liability
of one party to another has been determined by verdict or order or
judgment, but the amount or extent of the liability remains to be
determined by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make
an offer of judgment, which shall have the same effect as an offer made
before trial if it is served within a reasonable time not less than 10 days
prior to the commencement of hearings to determine the amount or extent
of liability.
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two-way cost-shifting.
A two-way cost-shifting rule, similar to Rule 68, has been implemented
in the State of California as Section 998 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure. Section 998 states: “Not less than 10 days prior to
commencement of trial or arbitration…any party may serve an offer in
writing upon any other party to the action to allow judgment to be taken or
an award to be entered in accordance with the terms and conditions stated at
that time.”15 This paper will examine the effectiveness of this symmetrical
cost-shifting rule in promoting pre-trial settlements.
B. Court Costs and Settlement Incentives
The word “costs” as used in Rule 68 and Section 998 is a term of art and
only refers to the shifting of certain costs. In Marek v. Chesny, the Supreme
Court found that: “the term ‘costs’ in Rule 68 was intended to refer to all
costs properly awardable under the relevant substantive statute or other
authority. In other words, all costs properly awardable in an action are to be
123–124 (1986) (arguing that a mutual offer of judgment cost-shifting rule (which includes
attorneys’ fees as costs) would provide greater benefits at less cost than the current Rule
68); Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Proposed Court Rules, 102 F.R.D. 407 (1984) (recommending Rule 68
should be modified so that all parties, including claimants, be allowed to make offers of
settlement under Rule 68).
15
CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 998 (b). See also CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 998(c)(1):
If an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to
obtain a more favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover
his or her postoffer costs and shall pay the defendant's costs from the
time of the offer. In addition, in any action or proceeding other than an
eminent domain action, the court or arbitrator, in its discretion, may
require the plaintiff to pay a reasonable sum to cover costs of the services
of expert witnesses, who are not regular employees of any party, actually
incurred and reasonably necessary in either, or both, preparation for
trial or arbitration, or during trial or arbitration, of the case by the
defendant.
And CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 998(d):
If an offer made by a plaintiff is not accepted and the defendant fails to
obtain a more favorable judgment or award in any action or proceeding
other than an eminent domain action, the court or arbitrator, in its
discretion, may require the defendant to pay a reasonable sum to cover
costs of the services of expert witnesses, who are not regular employees
of any party, actually incurred and reasonably necessary in either, or
both, preparation for trial or arbitration, or during trial or arbitration, of
the case by the plaintiff, in addition to plaintiff's costs.
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considered within the scope of Rule 68 ‘costs.’”16 Generally, this means
that recoverable costs are limited to things like filing fees,17 copying fees,18
and the costs for witnesses.19 In most instances, attorneys’ fees, by far the
most significant element trial expenditure, are not recoverable under Rule
68.20 The Supreme Court has stated that: “absent congressional expressions
to the contrary, where the underlying statute defines ‘costs’ to include
attorneys’ fees, we are satisfied such fees are to be included as costs for
purposes of Rule 68.”21
Section 998 does not expressly provide for the recovery of attorneys’
fees. Instead, attorneys’ fees may be awarded under Section 998 at the
court’s decision,22 if they are specificallyprovided for by statute, 23 and in a
number of other limited situations.24
In this paper, we examine two different cost environments, capturing the
inclusion and exclusion of attorneys’ fees as recoverable “costs.” This
comparison is important because scholars disagree about whether including
attorneys’ fees as costs would increase the likelihood of settlement.25
16

Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. at 9.
See 28 U.S.C. 1920(1), 1923 (1994). See also Gorelangton v. City of Reno, 638 F. Supp.
1426, 1433 (D. Nev. 1986) (allowing the recovery of filing fees); Raio v. American
Airlines, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 608, 611 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that recoverable costs include
the filing fee).
18
See 28 U.S.C. 1920(4) (1994). See also Radol v. Thomas, 113 F.R.D. 172, 175 (S.D.
Ohio 1986) (allowing recovery for the costs of copying for documents which were used
and admitted into evidence as well as for the cost of jury books); Gorelangton, 638 F.
Supp. at 1434 (permitting the recovery of photocopying costs).
19
See 28 U.S.C. 1821(b), 1920(3) (1994). See also Quy v. Air America, Inc., 667 F.2d
1059, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that witness costs are taxable under 28 U.S.C. 1821
even if the witness is called to testify at trial as long as the witness was called to be
available to testify on counsel’s good faith and reasonable judgment); Roberts v. S.S.
Kyriakoula D. Lemos, 651 F.2d 201, 203 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that travel costs of
witnesses are recoverable when witnesses appear pursuant to a court order, even if the
travel is from a foreign nation).
20
See, e.g., Agola v. Hagner, 678 F. Supp. 988, 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Avery Wiener Katz,
Indemnity of Legal Fees, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 63 (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000).
21
Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. at 9 (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346,
362–63 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
22
See CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 1021.1.
23
See id. at § 1021.
24
See CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. §§ 1021–1038.
25
Some scholars argue that fee shifting increases the likelihood of settlement. See, e.g.,
Joshua P. Davis, Toward a Jurisprudence of Trial and Settlement: Allocating Attorneys’
Fees by Amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, 48 ALA. L. REV. 65, 65–69 (1996)
(arguing that requiring the loser to pay if he had earlier rejected a settlement offer would
17
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Avery Wiener Katz explains:
The current state of economic knowledge does not enable us
reliably to predict whether a move to fuller indemnification
would raise or lower the total costs of litigation, let alone
whether it would better align those costs with any social
benefits they might generate.
The reason for this agnostic conclusion is straightforward.
Legal costs influence all aspects of the litigation process,
from the decision to file suit to the choice between
settlement and trial to the question whether to take
precautions against a dispute in the first place. . . . The
combination of all these external effects are too complicated
to be remedied by a simple rule of “loser pays.” Instead,
indemnity of legal fees remedies some externalities while
failing to address and even exacerbating others.26

C. Empirical Literature on Fee Shifting
There is a significant amount of theoretical research on fee shifting, but
relatively little empirical research. In one of the few empirical studies,
Coursey and Stanley used a set of experiments to simulate the process of
bargaining under the threat of trial.27 Their experiments were designed to
simulate three cost allocation rules: the American Rule, under which both
parties to a lawsuit bear their own legal costs; the English Rule, under
which the loser pays the legal costs of both parties; and Federal Rule 68.28
They find that subjects settled most frequently under Federal Rule 68,
second-most under the English Rule, and least of all under the American
Rule for cost allocation.29 Coursey and Stanley also report, however, that
increase the likelihood of settlement).
Others argue that fee shifting decrease the
likelihood of settlement. See, e.g., Anna Aven Sumner, Is the Gummy Rule of Today Truly
Better Than the Toothy Rule of Tomorrow? How Federal Rule 68 Should be Modified, 52
DUKE L.J. 1055 (2003). Stephen Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical
Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55
(1982).
26
Avery Wiener Katz, Indemnity of Legal Fees, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 64–65 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000).
27
Don L. Coursey & Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior Within The Shadow
of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 161 (1988).
28
Id. at 160.
29
Id. at 170.
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Rule 68 redistributes wealth from plaintiffs to defendants by creating
incentives for plaintiffs to accept lower settlement offers than they
otherwise would.30 They suggest that adoption of a symmetric cost-shifting
rule, such as Section 998, California Code of Civil Procedure, might
promote settlements while curbing Rule 68’s redistributive tendencies, but
do not test such a rule.31
Anderson and Rowe also conducted empirical research on fee shifting.32
They created an experiment that used computers to present participants (law
students and attorneys) with a theoretical tort case. The computer provided
information about claims and verdicts in similar cases and asked the
participants to give estimates of the percentage likelihood of verdicts above
several levels and a single best estimate of a likely jury award. 33 Anderson
and Rowe predicted that a modified version of Rule 68, which includes twoway attorney fee-shifting, increases the likelihood of settlement because the
attorney fee-shifting increased the maximum amount a defendant would be
willing to pay to settle and decreased the amount a plaintiff would be
willing to accept to settle. 34
A third empirical study was conducted by the Federal Judicial Center.
To assist the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference
of the United States in considering possible amendments to Rule 68, the
Federal Judicial Center sent surveys to a random sample of 1,951 attorneys
who had been involved in cases in the Federal courts. 35 The survey asked
the attorneys about the costs of the litigation in which they were involved,
the proportion of cases that went to trial which could have settled, what
portion of cases could have settled earlier, what portion of litigation
expenses might have been saved whether or not the case settled, whether an
offer-of-judgment rule hurt the risk-averse litigant, and the attorneys’ views
about offer-of-judgment rules.36 The survey’s authors conclude:
In spite of the dominance of opinion supporting an
amendment to strengthen Rule 68 by allowing any party to
make an offer of judgment and allowing the offeror to
30

Id. at 176.
Id.
32
David A. Anderson & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Empirical Evidence on Settlement Devices:
Does Rule 68 Encourage Settlement?, 71 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 519, 520 (1995).
33
Id. at 527.
34
Id. at 541–42.
35
John E. Shapard, Likely Consequences of Amendments to Rule 68, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 1–3, Federal Judicial Center (1995).
36
Id. at 5–6.
31
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recover at least some portion of its post-offer attorneys’ fees,
it is important to recognize that attorneys have strong
opinions on both sides of the issue. The majority believe
strongly that a strengthened Rule 68 would enhance access to
the courts, increase fairness, and reduce litigation expenses
and delay. A minority believe just as strongly, however, that
such a rule would penalize those seeking access to the
courts; produce unfair results; and increase the costs, delay,
and complexity of litigation.
The objective results, however, suggest that a strengthened
Rule 68 may produce more fairness and achieve a sizable
reduction in litigation expenses that are unnecessary,
abusive, or at least avoidable by encouraging settlement of
cases instead of trial or by encouraging earlier settlements.
Such a rule could also expedite disposition for settled cases
that could have settled earlier and for tried cases that could
reasonably settle rather than go to trial. A strengthened Rule
68 that precludes an award of expenses in excess of the
amount of a plaintiff’s judgment would most likely increase
the incidence of risk aversion only slightly while
encouraging litigation of small but strong claims and
discouraging pursuit of weak but high-stakes cases.37
Our experiment tests the recommendations of the majority of those
surveyed by studying the two-way cost shifting rule, currently implemented
as Section 998, California Rule of Civil Procedure.
In addition, we
compare the inclusion and exclusion of attorneys’ fees as costs for the
purposes of a cost-shifting rule.
D. Discovery
In this paper we also look at discovery and its impact on settlement
rates. We interpret the Federal Rules that relate to discovery as affecting
the information available to the parties.38 In our experiment, this is
captured by looking at symmetric and asymmetric information. We
examine how pre-trial negotiations and settlements are affected by these
informational differences.
37

Id. at 3.
This is to say that we do not look at any one rule specifically, such as Rule 26, but rather
we look at discovery as increasing the information available to both parties.

38
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Some scholars have argued that surprise in litigation is a good thing and
an integral part of the adversarial legal system.39 Others, such as Justice
Murphy, have argued that, “Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.”40 Edson
Sunderland, the drafter of what became Rules 26 to 3741 wrote:
It is probable that no procedural process offers greater
opportunities for increasing the efficiency of the
administration of justice than that of discovery before trial.
Much of the delay in the preparation of a case, most of the
lost effort in the course of the trial, and a large part of the
uncertainty in the outcome, result from the want of
information on the part of litigants and their counsel as to the
real nature of the respective claims and the facts upon which
they rest.42
Another legal scholar has explained that discovery’s proponents
believed that discovery would lead to a more efficient administration of
justice:
Besides converting trials and pretrial negotiations into more
orderly searches for the truth, discovery was expected to
reduce the number of trials and thus relieve the burden on the
courts. If the full truth would soon be revealed, fewer sham
suits would be filed. If the adversaries and the court knew
the facts before trial, the court could render more summary
judgments. If both sides knew the full truth and each other's
strengths and weaknesses, they would settle the case and
avoid the costs and uncertainties of trial. If both sides knew
all the facts, lawyers and clients would be more satisfied
with settlement terms and would carry out the agreement
willingly.43
In essence, with discovery, “Each party may in effect be called upon by
39

See, e.g., Kenneth B. Hawkins, What’s So Wrong About Surprise, 39 A.B.A.J. 1075
(1953).
40
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
41
Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed The Historical Background for the
1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 691, 698 (1998).
42
Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL
at iii (1932).
43
WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 11–12
(1968).
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his adversary or by the judge to lay all his cards upon the table, the
important consideration being who has the stronger hand, not who can play
the cleverer game.”44
Some researchers have studied the effect of informational symmetry on
settlement rates. For example, Babcock and Landeo studied pre-trial
bargaining in a state of asymmetric information.45 Their study also
examined the effect of a newly proposed litigation institution called a
settlement escrow. Babcock and Landeo examined subjects’ behavior as
they bargained with and without certainty46 and with and without escrow.47
They found that escrow only affected settlements when bargaining was
conducted under uncertainty.48 They also found that “when uncertainty was
present . . . settlement rates were positively and significantly influenced by
the escrow bargaining institution.”49 And lastly, they found that settlement
rates are negatively, but not significantly, influenced by uncertainty.50

II.

Experimental Design

This experiment models a lawsuit as a bargaining game between
subjects, interacting anonymously in the roles of plaintiff's attorney and
defense attorney.
A. The Economic Environment
Plaintiffs and defendants did not take part in the experiment but instead
44

Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L.
REV. 737, 739 (1939).
45
Linda Babcock & Claudia M. Landeo, Settlement Escrows: An Experimental Study of a
Bilateral Bargaining Game, 53 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 401 (2004). They describe a
settlement escrow as, a new litigation institution whereby:
a neutral agent receives settlement offers from both parties in a lawsuit.
If the defendant offers more than the plaintiff demands, the court imposes
a settlement at the midpoint of the offers. If the offers do not overlap in
this way, the offers remain secret and litigants proceed to pre-trial
bargaining.
Id. at 402.
46
Babcock and Landeo defined certainty was “where the plaintiff and defendant know the
true level of damages, and uncertainty as where the plaintiff know the damage level but the
defendant is uncertain about the damages caused to the plaintiff.” Id.
47
Id. at 406.
48
Id. at 410.
49
Id. at 409.
50
Id. at 410.
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were simulated. We modeled harm as the interaction between the
defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s susceptibility evaluated in monetary
terms. Each plaintiff incurred a level of harm which had an uncertain causal
relationship to the defendant’s action. This uncertainty produced a range of
potential court awards bounded below by Min and above by Max, where
Min and Max were related as follows:
Min = Max x C.
The factor C, between 0 and 1, captured the merit of the plaintiff’s
claim, whereas Max denoted the maximum damage awardable to any
claimant. In this experiment Max was an equiprobable random number
between 0 and 1000.
This study considers the results of sixteen experiments.
Each
experiment involved eight subjects, four acting as defense attorneys and
four as plaintiff’s attorneys.
Every experiment was divided into six
periods. Each period consisted of four suits that arose out of a single action
taken by the defendant. This resembles the real-world situation in which a
defendant took some action that caused harm to four different parties, each
of whom is then represented by the same attorney. For design purposes, all
four defendants caused the same level of harm in a given period and
encountered an identical set of plaintiffs.
Figure 1 shows the sequence of Min and Max values encountered by
each subject in the course of one experiment. Four pairs of subjects
experienced this environment simultaneously, giving us a total of 96 suits in
each experiment.
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Figure 1: Economic Environment

Cents
Period 1

800

Period 2

Period 3
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Period 5

Period 6

700
600
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400
300
200
100
0
0

5

9

13

17

Suits
Max
Min

In Period 1, for example, every defendant’s attorney, representing a
single defendant, was paired with a plaintiff’s attorney, representing four
different plaintiffs. These four suits, each with a different C-value, were
filed in the order shown. In Period 2, each defense attorney was paired with
another randomly selected plaintiff’s attorney, who again represents four
different plaintiffs. This process of re-matching at the start of each new
period continued throughout the experiment.

B. The Legal Process
In this study, the subjects participated in the pretrial bargaining process
shown in the flowchart in Figure 2. Before each suit began, the plaintiff’s
and defendant’s attorneys were each given information about some or all of

21

24
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Max, Min, and C, to enable them to estimate the magnitude of the plaintiff’s
harm.
Figure 2: The Legal Process

Make
Initial
Offer

Time
Up?

No
Accept
?
Yes
Settle

Yes

Go to
Court

No
Yes

New
No
Opposing
Offer?

Make
New
Offer?

No

Yes
Make New
Offer

The plaintiff’s attorney initiated the suit by paying a fee and submitting
a compensation request to the defendant’s attorney. The plaintiff’s attorney
was required to initiate every suit.
Bargaining continued until a predetermined amount of time had elapsed.
If no settlement had been reached within this time, the attorneys were
required to pay an additional fee to have the court settle the dispute. The
court was modeled as an equiprobable random decision between Min and
Max. Subjects were informed that the court judgment would be equally
probable, but, as described in subsection c, they did not know the actual
range of Min and Max in the asymmetric information treatment. On the
other hand, if either attorney accepted the current opposing offer before the

14
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time ran out, then the parties settled out of court, avoiding the additional
court fees and the court’s decision.

C. Experimental Treatments
This study consists of three treatments arranged in a 2x2x2 design. (See
Table 1) The primary goals of this design were (1) to test the effectiveness
of Section 998, California Code of Civil Procedure, in promoting out-ofcourt settlements; (2) to test the effects of information asymmetries
produced by disclosure rules, and (3) to look at the effect of court costs on
settlement decisions.
The first treatment studies cost-shifting by comparing Section 998 to the
American Rule, a simple no cost-shifting environment. In the case of
Section 998, any party who turned down a settlement offer that would have
been better for him than the court’s ultimate decision must pay the legal
costs of both sides. In the case of the American Rule, each party is strictly
responsible for his own expenses. Eight experiments were conducted using
Section 998 and eight using the American Rule.
A second treatment studies the effects of changing the information
available to the parties. For half of each experiment (three periods),
information given to the parties was both symmetric and complete. Both
the plaintiff’s attorney and the defense attorney knew the upper and lower
bound for every claim as well as its merits. For the other half of each
experiment, however, information was incomplete and asymmetric. In this
treatment, the defense attorney only knew the upper bound (Max), while the
plaintiff’s attorney only knew merits of the claim (C). Neither party knew
the lower bound (Min). In eight of the experiments, symmetric information
was presented first, while in the other eight, asymmetric information was
presented first.
The third treatment varies the cost of taking a case to trial. Within each
cost-shifting condition, we ran eight experiments with 50-cent court fees
and eight experiments with 150-cent court fees. In the case of Section 998,
this translates to increasing the penalty for rejecting favorable settlement
offers. (An offer is deemed favorable if it is better for the party in question
than the court-awarded decision.) Thus, under the low-fee version of
Section 998, rejection of a favorable offer results in a penalty of 100 cents;
under the high-fee condition, however, this penalty is increased to 300
cents. The high-fee condition captures the inclusion of attorney’s fees as
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recoverable “costs” under Section 998.51
Table 1 is also divided according to the values of Max and C. For half
of each experiment (3 periods), the defendant’s action produced a high
potential court award (Max 500); in the other three periods, Max was
below 500. Similarly, in each experiment, half of the suits had high merit
(C 0.5), while the other half had low merit. There are a total of 48 suits in
every cell of Table 1.

Table 1: Treatment Matrix
48 Suits in Each Block

ASYMMETRIC

SYMMETRIC

AMER.

998

1

High
FEE

2

AMER.
3

HIGH
Max
LOW
C

Low
FEE

High
FEE

5

6

9

10

13

51

4

AMER.

14

998

AMER.

998

18

19

20

17

HIGH
Max
HIGH
C

HIGH
Max
LOW
C

HIGH
Max
HIGH
C

7

8
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See e.g., Miller, supra note 14, and Shapard, supra note 35
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D. Experimental Procedures
The subjects for this study were primarily undergraduate students from
George Mason University, recruited by e-mail or by flyers distributed on
campus. Most had participated in previous behavioral experiments, but all
were new to this particular design. They were paid for arriving on time in
addition to their earnings in the experiment.
The experiments were conducted in the laboratories of the
Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and the Center for the Study
of Neuroeconomics at George Mason University. The laboratories
contained computer terminals for the subjects, separated by partitions to
ensure individual privacy. Talking between participants was not allowed.
Upon entering the laboratory, each subject was randomly assigned the
role of defense attorney or plaintiff’s attorney. They continued in these
roles for the duration of the experiment. The subjects were seated at
networked computer terminals and told to read through a set of online
instructions. Any questions were answered in the hearing of the whole
group before the start of the experiment.
The screen seen by a typical plaintiff’s attorney is shown in Figure 3. In
this example, the case had a C-value of 0.80, indicating strong merit,
although the maximum awardable damage was only 100.
Figure 3:

A Typical Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Task Screen

To guard against cultural preconceptions, the subjects were not told the
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legal nature of the experiment. Instead of “defense attorney” or “plaintiff’s
attorney” their roles were given to them as “Player D” or “Player T.” Other
legal terminology was also excluded; suits were referred to as “rounds” and
the court was introduced as “the computer.”
We provided the following incentives to the subjects. Each defense
attorney received a budget at the beginning of each period, from which he
had to finance the suits brought against his client. He was allowed to keep
whatever remained of these budgets at the end of the experiment. Plaintiffs'
attorneys received half of every settlement obtained for their clients minus
all court expenses.52
To reduce the risk of bankruptcy during the experiment, each
defendant’s attorney began the experiment with 2000 cents and received a
fresh budget of 1500 cents at the start of every period. After all lawsuits
and court fees had been subtracted, the defendant’s attorney kept the
remaining sum as his earnings for the experiment. Each plaintiff’s attorney
began the experiment with 1000 cents. The plaintiff’s attorney did not
receive further endowments, but kept half of every settlement or decision,
minus the initiation fees and any court fees, as his earnings. Every subject
could see his accumulated earnings throughout the experiment. (See the
box labeled “Cash” in Figure 3).
As shown in Figure 3, the latest offers were displayed in boxes labeled
“Your Offer” and “Counterparts Offer.” To accept an offer, a subject
simply repeated his counterpart’s offer as his offer. Bargaining lasted for up
to two minutes. If the parties reached an agreement within the allotted time,
the defendant’s attorney paid the negotiated amount from his budget and the
plaintiff’s attorney kept half of this as payment. The other half was paid to
the simulated plaintiff. If they did not agree, the computer, acting as the
52

It is customary for the client to pay court costs, travel expenses, and other litigation
costs. In the experiment, clients are not represented by a subject who negotiates with his or
her attorney. While this is an interesting line of research, it detracts from studying the
adversarial relationship between plaintiffs and defendants. In order to focus on the
adversarial nature of torts the principal/agent problem is minimized by having the
plaintiff’s attorney share the same incentives as the plaintiff.
It is customary for defendants to pay their attorneys on an hourly basis. However, the type
of defendant modeled here is a repeat player and as such can monitor the performance of
his attorney over time. Under this arrangement the defendant has more control over the
litigation costs than merely being charged an hourly rate. We model this by giving each
defense attorney a budget. This allows us to minimize the principal/agent problem and to
focus on the adversarial nature of torts.
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court, imposed a random decision between Min and Max and both attorneys
were assessed a court fee. The court decision was paid from the defendant’s
budget and awarded in equal shares to the plaintiff and his attorney.

III.

RESULTS
A. Measurement

In each experiment, we recorded the series of offers made by each
attorney and whether or not a settlement was reached. In this paper we
report the following data: (1) The final offers, before settlement or court
decisions, (2) the settlement amount, if applicable, and (3) the court
decision, otherwise. Figure 4 shows this data for all four pairs of subjects
during the first two periods of one experiment. “Upper Spread” indicates
the last offer submitted by the plaintiff’s attorney prior to the decision
(settlement or trial). “Lower Spread” indicates the last offer submitted by
the defense attorney. Solid circles indicate a settlement, while solid squares
indicate a court decision.
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Data Sample (2 Periods)
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B. Data Analysis
1. Settlements
First we consider the effects of our treatments on subjects’ tendency to
reach a settlement before trial. Settlement rates for each condition are
reported in Table 2.

Table 2:

Settlement Rates
Percentage of Suits that Settled
Percentage of Settlements that Favored Plaintiff (Settlement - Midpoint > 0)
48 Suits in Each Block
SYM

Max

High
Fee

Low
Fee

High
Fee

Low
Fee

ASYM

American

§ 998

American

§ 998

1
85.42

2
89.58

3
77.08

21.95

34.88

5
60.42

Max

American

§ 998

American

§ 998

4
85.42

17
83.33

18
83.33

19
81.25

20
83.33

13.51

12.20

45.00

37.50

15.38

17.50

6
58.33

7
56.25

8
64.58

21
79.17

22
60.42

23
60.42

24
58.33

17.24

35.71

14.81

35.48

15.79

48.28

10.34

25.00

9
81.25

10
77.08

11
91.67

12
87.50

25
66.67

26
75.00

27
50.00

28
45.83

48.72

56.76

43.18

50.00

75.00

77.78

41.67

68.18

13
62.50

14
66.67

15
83.33

16
75.00

29
47.92

30
43.75

31
33.33

32
29.17

36.67

59.38

32.50

38.89

69.57

76.19

25.00

50.00
C

C

The top entry in each cell of Table 2 gives the percentage of suits in that
cell for which the subjects were able to reach a settlement.
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A t-test was used to make a cell by cell comparison (N = 48) of
settlement rates between the American rule and Section 998 we find only
the comparison of cells 21 and 22 (see Table 1) shows a significant
difference at the .05 level. This difference goes away when we compare 21
+ 29 with 22 + 30. Thus we are led to conclude that the American rule and
Section 998 have the same effect on pretrial settlement rates.
Next, a t-test was used to make a row by row comparison (N = 192) of
settlement rates between the High Fee and Low Fee treatments we find a
significant difference at below the .01 level for all 4 comparisons. We are
led to conclude that the increase in court fees creates a strong incentive for
early settlement.
Finally, a t-test was used to make a row by row comparison (N = 192)
of settlement rates between the Symmetric (SYM) and Asymmetric
(ASYM) information treatments. We find a significant difference at below
the .01 level for the Low Max cells (see Table 1) in both the High and Low
Fee treatments. We find no significant differences in the High Max cells.
We are led to conclude that the asymmetry of information greatly reduces
settlement rates when the maximum potential court award (Max) is low.
The second entry in each cell of Table 2 indicates the percentage of
settlements that were favorable to the plaintiff’s attorney. A settlement is
deemed favorable to the plaintiff’s attorney, relative to the expected court
award, if it is greater than the midpoint between Min and Max.53 Consistent
with their threat points in this experiment, plaintiff’s attorneys often settled
below the midpoint, although, in all but two of the comparisons, plaintiff’s
attorneys did better under Section 998 than under the American rule. We
are led to conclude that Section 998 improves outcomes for plaintiffs over
the American rule.
Figure 5 examines how the settlement rates vary with the level of
uncertainty about the court’s decision. The main source of uncertainty
under symmetric information is the range of the court’s decision. When the
difference between Max and Min is large, the court’s decision is more
uncertain, since all values over this range are equiprobable. The columns in
Figure 5 represent the uncertainty level, i.e., Max - Min, for each of the 24
suits. The suits have been sorted from least uncertainty to greatest. The
53

In this experiment no performance measure exists for deciding whether a particular
settlement is ‘fair’ to the plaintiff, the defendant, or society as a whole. Instead we
determine how favorable or unfavorable the outcome is, in a more limited sense, by
comparing settlement outcome to expected court decisions.
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squares show the number of settlements that occurred in each suit,
multiplied by 50 for scaling purposes. The American Rule and Section 998
treatments have been combined for this analysis, since there are no
significant differences in settlement rates between them.

Figure 5: Settlement Rates and Increasing Uncertainty in Court Decisions
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Under symmetric information, we find that subjects settle the lowuncertainty cases more frequently with settlement rates falling as
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uncertainty increases. This is most evident in the Low Fee Sym cases,
although the effect is present in the High Fee Sym cases as well. However,
the strong incentives for settlement produced by the High Fees this trend
less pronounced. The opposite effect occurs in the asymmetric information
cases. We believe this is due to the additional uncertainty caused by
differences in expectations under asymmetric information.
Under asymmetric information, the defendant knows Max, and that C is
equally likely between 0 and 1 with a mean of 0.5. Therefore the
defendant’s expected min is EMin = 0.5 * Max. The defendant’s
anticipated court award is then DAC = Emin + (Max – Emin)/2 = 0.75 *
Max. The plaintiff knows C so Emax = 500 and Emin = C * 500.
Therefore , the plaintiff’s anticipated court award is PAC = Emin + (Emax –
Emin)/2 = 250(1+C). We can now measure the additional uncertainty
caused by a lack of mutual expectations as the unsigned difference between
defendant’s and plaintiff’s expected court awards, i.e., U = | DAC – PAC |.
For this model, over optimism occurs when PAC > Min + (Max – Min)/2
for the plaintiff, or when DAC < Min + (Max – Min)/2.
Figure 6 shows how settlements rates are affected by differences in
expectations U. Notice that settlement rates tend to decline as U increases,
and for U > 125 the variance in settlement rates increases dramatically.
Figure 6: Differences in Expectations Affect Settlement Rates
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Figure 7 shows the number of subjects who settled a given number of
their 24 suits. For example, 27 subjects settled either 17 or 18 of their suits.
The number of settlements appears to be negative binomially distributed
with a mode of 18 and a mean of 16.25.

Figure 7: Individual Propensity to Settle
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2. Efficiency
Several lawsuits in each treatment are inefficient by virtue of the
experimental environment. A lawsuit is considered ex ante inefficient if
Max – Min 2 * CourtFee. If this condition holds, the parties always stand
to save money by settling the dispute without going to court. Costminimizing subjects would never proceed to trial under such condition.
Figure 8 shows the number of ex ante inefficient cases within each
treatment, as well as how many of them actually went to court. Notice that
by this measure, inefficiency was quite low. Furthermore, high court fees
tended to decrease the percentage of inefficient cases that went to court.
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Figure 8: Ex Ante Inefficiency
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Figure 9 examines a stricter definition of efficiency by comparing the
total number of court cases in each treatment to the number of times when
either party failed to cost-minimize in his decision to go to court. A
defendant has failed to cost-minimize if the last offer received from the
plaintiff is less than the expected court outcome plus the court fee., i.e.,
Last_Opposing_Offer < (Min + Max)/2 + Court_Fee.
A plaintiff has failed to cost-minimize if the last offer received from the
defendant is greater than the half the expected court decision minus the
court fee, i.e.,
Last_Opposing_Offer > 1/2(Min + Max)/2) - Court_Fee.
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Clearly, if either of these conditions hold, at least one attorney would
have been better off accepting the opposing attorney’s offer instead of going
to court. Since these calculations can only be made at the conclusion of the
bargaining process, we refer to this form of inefficiency as ex post
inefficiency. Notice that ex post inefficiencies are much more likely to
occur than ex ante inefficiencies. Furthermore, high court costs tend to
exacerbate this form of inefficiency.
Figure 9: Ex Post Inefficiency
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Figure 10 separates these inefficiency levels by role, demonstrating that
plaintiffs are twice as likely as defendants to be the cause of ex post
inefficiency.
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Figure 10: Ex Post Inefficiency Sorted by Role
All Treatments
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3. Fee-Shifting
The final analysis focuses exclusively on the effects of Section 998 on
the distribution of court costs. The first row of each cell in Table 3 gives
the number of times a penalty occurred (i.e., one party had to pay the court
costs of both sides) compared to the total number of court cases. As can be
seen, penalties were applied over 76% of the time. This implies that the
majority of the subjects who went to court had rejected advantageous offers
at some point during the negotiation process.
The second row of each cell in Table 3 breaks down the frequency of
penalties between defense attorneys (D) and plaintiff’s attorneys (P). We
find a systematic difference in these frequencies only in the Low Max
condition where plaintiff’s attorneys are 4 times more likely to be penalized
than defense attorneys.
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Table 3: Analysis of Section 998 Penalties

Analysis of Section 998 Penalties
48 Suits in Each Block
Number of Times Penalty was Assigned / Total Number of Court Cases

Max

High
Fees

Low
Fees

High
Fees

Low
Fees

Sym
2
4/5

Asym
18
8/8

Sym
4
6/7

Asym
20
7/8

D = 0, P = 4

D = 4, P = 4

D = 6, P = 0

D = 4, P = 3

6
18 / 20

22
12 / 19

8
14 / 17

24
13 / 20

D = 7, P = 11

D = 6, P = 6

D = 11, P = 3

D = 9, P = 4

10
7 / 11

26
11 / 12

12
3/5

28
15 / 26

D = 1, P = 6

D = 0, P = 11

D = 2, P = 1

D = 4, P =11

14
16 / 16

30
25 / 27

16
6 / 12

32
24 / 34

D = 5, P=11

D = 3, P = 22

D = 1, P = 5

D = 5, P = 19
C

IV.

CONCLUSIONS

In our experiments we show that a symmetric fee shifting rule, such as
Section 998, California Code of Civil Procedure, does not change the
tendency to settle before trial. However, Section 998 produces settlement
outcomes more favorable to plaintiffs than does the American rule. This
suggests that Section 998 makes defendants more cautious during
negotiations with plaintiffs. This interpretation is further substantiated by
the fact that defendants were penalized less often for rejecting favorable
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offers, only 67 times, compared to plaintiffs who were penalized 120 times.
In other comparisons, our subjects tend to behave rationally when
confronted with changes in the magnitude of court costs. The overall
settlement rate under low costs was 58.7% compared to 77.7% under high
costs. Also, cases settled more often under symmetric information: 75.1%
of the time, compared to 61.3% under asymmetric information. Overall,
this suggests that subjects behave rationally with respect to better
information and increased opportunity cost of going to court.
Symmetric information, as promoted by liberal discovery rules,
improves the efficient use of the courts. In particular, the court is used less
when there is a smaller range of potential outcomes producing less
uncertainty among participants. In the asymmetric treatment the efficient
use of the courts tends to decrease. In particular, additional uncertainty
about the potential outcome can cause to become overly optimistic leading
to bargaining failures
In the asymmetric information treatments, most of the difference in
settlement rates can be attributed to cases with low maximum potential
court awards (Max). Our interpretation is that plaintiffs, not knowing Max,
are likely to have too optimistic an idea of what they can get in court and
therefore to reject reasonable defendant offers. This interpretation is further
substantiated by the excessive penalizing of plaintiffs in the low Max
conditions under Section 998. (See Table 3) Consider also the significant
improvement in settlements in the low Max conditions, favoring plaintiffs.
(See Table 2)
Finally, when we look at efficiency, as measured by whether or not the
court should have been avoided, we observe an interesting difference when
we compare ex ante to ex post efficiency. First, using an ex antemeasure of
efficiency, we observe that 20% of the cases that should have settled
actually ended up in court. While efficiency is not affected by the switch
between the American rule and Section 998, efficiency measures do
improve under higher court costs. This result is consistent with the increase
in settlement rates due to higher court costs.
However, when we look at ex post inefficiency by taking into account
the final offers that were made before going to court, we see a dramatic
decrease in inefficiency, with 67% of the cases that should have settled
ending up in court. Furthermore, this inefficiency is exacerbated by high
court costs. Since ex ante efficiency is more likely than ex post to be

30

EXPERIMENTS ON FEE SHIFTING AND DISCOVERY

[10-Mar-05

measured in field studies, these results suggest that a more cautious
interpretation of field data is required. It may be that rules which encourage
the taking of final offers could have a dramatic effect on the overall
efficiency in use of the courts.

